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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BENJAMIN FRANK LUCERO, : 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
v. •':'•' CaseNo. 20020984-CA 
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD; : 
CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM; 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL; : 
MURRAY CITY JUSTICE COURT, : 
Plaintiffs/Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE MURRAY JUSTICE COURT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court lacks jurisdiction of this case. This is not an appeal from a de 
novo trial in the District court. This is not an appeal seeking to vacate the conviction 
and guilty plea by Defendant Lucero in the Murray City Justice Court ("Murray 
Justice Court"). 
Rather, Defendant/Appellant, Benjamin Frank Lucero ("Defendant Lucero") 
appeals a dismissal, by the District Court, of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
or, in the alternative, Motion to Correct Illegally Imposed Sentence. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Since Defendant Lucero did not appeal his plea of guilty, entered by the 
Murray Justice Court, to the District Court for a de novo review, does 
this Court lack jurisdiction of this case? 
2. Is there a reasonable basis, considering the record as a whole, to support 
the District Court's decision that Defendant Lucero knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Murray Justice Court asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review 
this matter. If this Court determines that it does have jurisdiction, the standard of 
review is "clear error" for the District Court's factual findings and "correctness" for 
its conclusions of law. 
As this Court stated in Matthews v. Galetka: l 
"[o]ur standard of review for an appeal from a dismissal of a 
petition for post-conviction relief depends on the issue appealed. 
Though we review the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness, we will disturb findings of fact only if they are 
clearly erroneous. Further, we survey the record in the light 
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we will not 
reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial 
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted." 
(internal citations omitted and emphasis added). 
This Court, therefore, gives deference to the factual findings and conclusions of law 
1
 Matthews v. Galetka. 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
2 
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of the District Court and will not disturb those findings of fact and conclusions of law 
if there is reasonable basis to support them. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following Constitutional and Statutory provisions are controlling in this 
case: 
1. U.S. CONST, amend. VI.2 
2. UTAH CONST, art VIII, § l.3 
1 UTAH CODE ANN. §78-5-101 (2002).4 
4. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-120(l)(a) (2002).5 
5. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-5-120(7) (2002).6 
6. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-35a-102(l)(2002).7 
7. RULES 65B AND 65C OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.8 
2
 Text in Addendum A-1, attached. 
3
 Text in Addendum A-l, attached. 
4
 Text in Addendum A-2, attached. 
5
 Text in Addendum A-2, attached. 
6
 Text in Addendum A-2, attached. 
7
 Text in Addendum A-2, attached. 
8
 Text in Addendum A-3-through A-14, attached. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 29, 2002, Defendant Lucero pled guilty in the Murray Justice Court 
to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, a class "B" misdemeanor 
under § 41-6-44 of the Utah Code Ann. With this plea of guilty, a second count of 
improper usage of lanes was dismissed.9 Defendant Lucero was sentenced to jail. 
After sentencing, Defendant Lucero filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or, in 
the alternative, Motion to Correct Illegally Imposed Sentence in Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah under Rules 65B and 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure.10 Defendant Lucero did not appeal to the District Court for a trial de 
novo. 
Defendant Lucero's Petition in District Court did not challenge his guilty plea 
and conviction, but only sought to vacate his suspended jail sentence. Murray City 
filed a Motion to Dismiss.11 Following an evidentiary hearing on September 16, 
2002, the District Court, Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding, dismissed Defendant 
Lucero's Petition for Extraordinary and Post-Conviction Relief. At the time of the 
evidentiary hearing and thereafter, Defendant Lucero was not incarcerated.12 
Defendant Lucero filed this appeal. 
9R.31. 
10
 R. 1-2. 
11
 R 9-10. 
12
 R. 100-102. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Murray City charged Defendant Lucero with driving under the influence of 
alcohol ("DUI"), a class B misdemeanor, and improper usage of lanes, a Class C 
misdemeanor, that occurred on March 17,2001.13 
2. Jurisdiction and venue were proper in the Murray Justice Court.14 Murray 
Justice Court Judge P. Gary Ferrero ("Judge Ferrero") presided over the case.15 
3. Under the UTAH CONSTITUTION and Utah Statutory law, the Murray 
Justice Court is a court not of record.16 
4. Defendant Lucero was arraigned in the Murray Justice Court on June 14, 
2001.17 At that time, Defendant Lucero was "[ajdvised of rights and penalties," 
including his right to counsel.18 A pretrial conference was scheduled for July 20, 
2001.19 
13
 R. 28. 
14
 R. 28. 
15R.28. 
16
 UTAH CONST, art. VIII, 31 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-101 (2002). 
17R.29. 
18R.29. 
19R.29. 
5 
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5. Prior to his arraignment on July 20, 2002, Defendant Lucero watched the 
"Rights of Criminal Defendants" video narrated by Judge Michael Hutchings.20 
6. Defendant Lucero recalled the portion of the video where Judge Hutchings 
advises that defendants have a right to have an attorney with them.21 Defendant 
Lucero also recalled the video explaining that if a defendant could not afford an 
attorney, one would be appointed at public expense.22 
7. The "Rights of Criminal Defendants" video advises defendants of: (a) the 
effect of different pleas, (b) the rights waived by pleading guilty or no contest, (c) 
potential maximum penalties, and (d) other related information. Included in the video 
viewed by Defendant Lucero is the following statement: 
[You have] the right to hire your own lawyer to represent 
you. If you will be hiring your own lawyer, please tell the 
judge today. If you want to have a lawyer represent you 
and if you do not have the money to hire one, you can ask 
the judge to appoint a public defender. You will need to 
tell the judge about your financial situation, and the judge 
will decide if you qualify for a public defender.23 
8. Prior to every arraignment, Judge Ferrero confirms that each defendant has 
watched the "Rights of Criminal Defendants" video.24 
20
 R. 116:21. 
21
 R. 116:21. 
22
 R. 116:21-22. 
23
 R. 116:21-22. 
24R.77. 
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9. After confirming that each defendant has seen the video explaining 
defendants' rights at the arraignment hearing, Judge Ferrero orally advises defendants 
of their rights, including their right to be represented by an attorney before he asks 
defendants how they wish to plead.25 
10. Judge Ferrero, as part of his standard process, informs defendants of their 
constitutional rights, including their right to be represented by an attorney and that if 
they could not afford to hire an attorney, one could be appointed to them free of 
charge.26 
11. Defendant Lucero did not ask specifically for a lawyer, but told Judge 
Ferrero that he could not afford an attorney.27 Defendant Lucero understood, 
however, that if he qualified for a public defender, one would be appointed by the 
Murray Justice Court.28 
12. At the pretrial conference in the Murray Justice Court on July 20, 2001, 
Defendant Lucero made a motion to continue the pretrial conference so that he could 
25
 R. 77, 85. 
26
 R. 78, 86. 
27
 R. 116:22. 
28
 R. 116:22. 
7 
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"look into retaining private counsel."29 Defendant Lucero's motion was granted and 
the pretrial conference was continued until October 26, 2001.30 
13. At the pretrial conference in the Murray Justice Court on October 26, 
2001, Defendant Lucero again made a motion for continuance of the pretrial 
conference.31 The reason for the continuance was that Defendant Lucero was 
"[retaining private counsel."32 The pretrial conference was rescheduled for January 
2,2002.33 
14. At the pretrial conference on January 2, 2002, Defendant Lucero appeared 
pro se.3A A bench trial was scheduled for April 29, 2002 in the Murray Justice 
Court.35 
15. On April 24, 2002, prior to the bench trial date, Defendant Lucero "called 
to inform the court that he would like to just pay [a] fine instead of [having a] trial."36 
29
 R. 30. 
30
 R. 30. 
31
 R. 30. 
32
 R. 30. 
33
 R. 30. 
34
 R. 31. 
35
 R. 30. 
36R.31. 
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16. On April 29, 2002, Defendant Lucero signed a "Driving Under the 
Influence Rights Waiver" ("Rights Waiver").37 The Rights Waiver provides 
information about Defendant Lucero's rights and the effect of waiving those rights, 
the elements and misdemeanor classification of a DUI, and the right of withdrawing a 
plea.38 The Rights Waiver specifies the limits of penalties for a DUI conviction to be 
0-180 days in jail and from $0-$l,850 in fines.39 The Rights Waiver states, "I have 
the right to consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge were to 
determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint 
one to represent me."40 
17. The Rights Waiver also states: 
I understand each of these constitutional rights. They 
have been explained to me by the judge or a lawyer. I 
have no questions about them. I know that I could plead 
not guilty and exercise all of the rights listed above. I 
understand that by entering a plea of guilty[,] I AM 
GIVING UP THESE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
(emphasis in original).41 
18. The Rights Waiver also states: 
37
 R. 18. See Appellant's Addendum "H". 
38R. 15-18. 
39R. 17. 
40R. 15. 
41
 R. 16. 
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"Of my own choice I enter this plea... I have read this 
document or had it read to me. I understand its contents 
and adopt each statement in it as my own. By signing this 
document I am saying that I ENTER A PLEA OF 
GUILTY to Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol/Drugs." (emphasis in original). 42 
19. On April 29, 2002, Defendant Lucero represented himself pro se at the 
bench trial.43 "[T]he information [was] read" and the "Court advise[d] defendant of 
rights and penalties."44 Sentencing was scheduled for June 4, 2002.45 
20. Judge Ferrero remembers Defendant Lucero specifically, but does not 
recall exactly what he asked Defendant Lucero.46 Judge Ferrero followed his usual 
procedure with Defendant Lucero.47 Judge Ferrero has defendants read and sign the 
waiver and then conducts a colloquy with defendants to satisfy himself that the 
waiver is done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.48 Judge Ferrero goes 
through the elements of the offense, the possible sentences, and advises them about 
42
 R. 17. 
43R.31. 
44
 R. 31. 
45
 R. 31. 
46
 R. 116: 
47
 R. 116: 
48R116: 
16. 
16. 
16-17. 
10 
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each of the rights they are waiving, including the right to be represented by counsel.4S 
Judge Ferrero reviews the right to counsel with the defendants and helps them 
understand that if they cannot afford one, one will be appointed.50 When Judge 
Ferrero is through asking them all of these questions, and if he is satisfied that the 
defendants have waived their rights and entered the plea freely, voluntarily, 
knowingly, and without being under the influence of substances, then Judge Ferrero 
signs the rights waiver and his signature is certification that all of these precautions 
have been taken.51 
21. On April 29, 2002, Defendant Lucero pleaded guilty to the charge of DUI 
and the court ordered the second count be dismissed upon motion from the Murray 
City Prosecutor.52 
22. Defendant Lucero did understand that he had a right to have an attorney 
present and that one could be appointed if he was too poor.53 
49
 R. 116: 16-17. 
50R. 116: 17. 
51
 R. 116: 17. 
52R.31 
53
 R. 116:34. 
11 
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23. At the sentencing hearing on June 4, 2002, Defendant Lucero was 
sentenced to a jail term of 180 days, required to pay a fine of $1850.00, and placed on 
probation for 18 months.54 A review hearing was scheduled for September 5, 2002.55 
24. A defendant may appeal a Murray Justice Court decision to the District 
Court, a court of record, by filing timely written notice. " . . . In a criminal case, a 
defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court only if the defendant files a 
notice of appeal within 30 days of . . . sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a plea 
of guilty in the justice court resulting in a finding or verdict of guilt.. ."56 
25. Defendant Lucero did not appeal his Murray Justice Court guilty plea and 
conviction to the District Court. 
26. On July 3, 2002, the Murray Justice Court docket reflects a filing of 
"Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or, in the alternative, Motion to Correct Illegally 
Imposed Sentence".57 
27. On August 1, 2002, Lucero filed a "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or, 
in the alternative, Motion to Correct Illegally Imposed Sentence" in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah under Rules 65B and 65C of the Utah Rules 
54
 R. 32. 
55
 R. 32. 
56
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-120 (2002). 
57
 R. 84. 
12 
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of Civil Procedure ("Petition").58 The Petition alleged that Defendant Lucero "was 
not represented by counsel" and "had not waived counsel" and "was sentenced to jail 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment."59 The Petition sought an Extraordinary Writ 
granting Defendant Lucero immediate release.60 The "Memorandum in Support of 
Petition for Release" claimed that "petitioner's jail sentence must be vacated because 
it was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment and Alabama v. Shelton." 
i (citation omitted).61 
28. On September 10, 2002, at a scheduled review hearing, Defendant 
Lucero's remaining jail sentence was suspended by the Murray Justice Court and < 
Defendant Lucero was released from custody.62 Defendant Lucero has not been 
incarcerated for the DUI offense since then. 
29. On September 16, 2002, a hearing was held in the District Court before 
Judge Glen Iwasaki on Defendant Lucero's Petition. Defendant Lucero was present 
, , < 
and represented by legal counsel. 
i 
* 
i 
13 
58
 R. 1. 
59
 R. 1. 
60
 R. 1. 
61
 R.26. 
62
 R. 5. 
63
 R. 116. 
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30. The District Court determined, without objection from Defendant Lucero, 
that: 
"[indigency is not an issue in this matter - it's right to counsel, and 
whether or not he exercised that right, whether it was afforded or not, 
either indigent or not indigent."64 
31. Defendant Lucero did not seek, as part of his remedy, a de novo trial in 
District court. Rather, with assistance of counsel, Defendant Lucero advised the 
District Court that he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea or "upset" his 
conviction and that his guilty plea and conviction were proper. The relief Defendant 
Lucero wanted was for the District Court to vacate the suspended jail sentence 
imposed by the Murray Justice Court.65 
32. The District Court made the following findings and decision: (a) 
Defendant Lucero understood that he had a right to counsel and if he could not afford 
an attorney, one could be appointed by the Judge and (b) Defendant Lucero 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be represented by an attorney.66 
33. Defendant Lucero filed this appeal reaffirming that he does not seek to 
upset his guilty plea or conviction.67 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
64
 R. 116:17. 
65R. 116:5and6. 
66R. 101. 
67
 R. 116: 25, 36, Appellant's Brief at 43. 
14 
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Defendant Lucero does not challenge his plea of guilty and conviction. 
Through his legal counsel, Defendant Lucero expressly states that his guilty plea and 
conviction were proper. He wants this Court to vacate his suspended jail sentence. 
The Murray Justice Court argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to 
consider this appeal. In order for this Court to have jurisdiction, Defendant Lucero 
was required to exhaust his available remedies by appealing his guilty plea and 
i 
sentence to the District Court, a court of record, for a trial de novo, as provided by 
§78-5-120(l)(a) of the Utah Code. Defendant Lucero did not appeal his plea of 
guilty and conviction, and the resulting sentence, to the District Court, for a trial de i 
novo, because he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea and conviction. Rather, 
he filed a Petition for Extraordinary and Post-Conviction Relief under Rules 65B and 
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to circumvent the orderly procedure 
provided in State law to challenge, on Constitutional grounds, parts of his sentence. 
If this Court has jurisdiction, the Murray Justice Court argues that there was a 
reasonable basis for the District Court's decision in dismissing the Petition for 
Extraordinary and Post-Conviction Relief. Since justice courts are courts not of 
record, there is no recording of a colloquy between Defendant Lucero and the Murray 
Justice Court Judge. Therefore, in reviewing whether a valid waiver of the right to 
counsel was made, by necessity and extraordinary circumstance, the District Court 
must rely on the whole record. 
15 
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In reviewing the record as a whole, the District Court had a reasonable basis to 
find that Defendant Lucero made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to 
counsel and chose to proceed pro se. The Murray Justice Court did as much as a 
court of non-record could do to ensure that Defendant Lucero knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. The undisputed evidence shows that the 
Murray Justice Court advised Defendant Lucero of his constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel, and both Defendant Lucero and Defendant Lucero's Counsel 
indicated that Defendant Lucero understood that right. He made motions for 
continuances to retain counsel. He viewed a video that is used in Utah courts 
advising defendants of their rights, including their right to counsel. Defendant 
Lucero possessed enough intelligence and capacity to represent himself in pleading 
guilty. Before pleading guilty, Defendant Lucero read, signed and reviewed with the 
Murray Justice Court Judge a Rights Waiver which indicated the specific charges in 
his case, the elements of the charges, and the possible penalties. 
Most importantly, even with counsel, Defendant Lucero does not wish to 
change his plea of guilty or vacate his conviction. Through counsel, Defendant 
Lucero represented to the District Court that his guilty plea and conviction were 
proper. It is incongruous for Defendant Lucero to argue that he has no constitutional 
challenges to his guilty plea and conviction, the critical point at which he needed to 
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recognize his right to counsel, and yet, for sentencing, he did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his right to counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
SINCE DEFENDANT LUCERO FAILED TO APPEAL HIS 
GUILTY PLEA, ENTERED IN THE MURRAY JUSTICE 
COURT, TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR A TRIAL DE NOVO, 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OF THIS CASE 
A. Defendant Lucero Should Have Filed an Appeal With the District Court 
For Trial De Novo. 
Utah law provides an adequate remedy for convicted justice court defendants. 
Section 78-5-120(l)(a) of the Utah Code states: "In a criminal case, a [justice court] 
defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court...."68 Effectively, a trial de 
novo makes moot any claim of error from justice court including a denial of counsel. 
A defendant's case starts over as if there had been no proceeding in justice court. 
Although Lucero claims that his right to counsel was violated, he concedes his plea 
and conviction are valid. Appellant's Brief at 43. It is the incarceration he dislikes.69 
By choosing extraordinary relief over an appeal, Defendant Lucero, has tried to 
manipulate his sentence to avoid incarceration.70 The Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
establishes a "legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence 
68
 UTAH CODE ANN. §78-5-120(l)(a) (2002). 
69
 R. 116:36-7. 
70Factl32. 
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for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a 
direct appeal../'.71 "A petition for habeas corpus is a collateral attack of a ... sentence 
and is not a substitute for direct appellate review."72 Defendant Lucero forfeited his 
right to claim error when he did not exhaust his appeal remedy and should, therefore, 
be denied any post-conviction review. 
"No procedural rule is more familiar . . . than a constitutional right, or a right 
of any other sort, that may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure 
to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine 
it."73 The Utah Supreme Court has likewise made clear that 
"[a]ny issues that were not addressed on direct appeal but could have 
been raised may not be raised for the first time in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding absent unusual circumstances. This rule applies to all 
claims, including constitutional questions."74 
Important policy considerations underlie the doctrine of bringing a timely 
claim in the proper forum. First, this requirement provides the initial trial court, 
71
 UTAH CODE ANN. §78-35a-102(l)(2002) (emphasis added). 
72Carter v. Galetka. 2001, UT 96,16, 44 P.3d 626, 630 citing Gardner v. 
HoMen, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994). See also Lindeman v. Morris, 641 P.2d 133 
(Utah 1982) citing Morishita v. Morris. 621 P.2d 691 (Utah 1980), Brown v. Turner. 
21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (Utah 1968), Brvant v. Turner. 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 
P.2d 121 (1967). 
73
 United States v. Olano. 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
74
 Rudolph v. Galetka. 2002 UT 7, <P, 43 P.3d 467, 468, citing Carter v. 
Galetka. 2001 UT 96,16,44 P.3d 626. 
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justice court in this case, to discover, mitigate and cure any erroneous decision 
without further judicial intervention. A motion to withdraw his plea in the Murray 
Justice Court, for example, would have resulted in a review by the court he claims 
erred, and if in agreement, that court could have corrected an error immediately and 
eliminated further judicial proceedings. Moreover, if Defendant Lucero had taken a 
direct appeal to the District Court, his claim of error would have ceased to exist. A 
trial de novo, defined as "[a] new trial on the entire case-that is, on both questions of 
fact and issues of law-conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance" 
makes moot claims of error from justice courts.75 It also allows the development of 
factual background since proceedings in District Court are recorded.76 
Second, bringing a timely claim in the proper tribunal reduces the risk of 
unfair surprise and manipulation by a party. Parties cannot stand silently by and 
allow a court to proceed along an erroneous course and then claim error later. 
Defendants are prevented from maneuvering around their sentences when they decide 
they are unhappy with them. If Defendant Lucero had appealed to District Court, he 
would not be in a position to claim error based on the statutory and constitutional 
grounds that justice courts are courts not of record. He points to the absence of a 
record, and suggests that, as a result, he can effectively choose no jail time. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 (7th Edition, 1999). 
Utah R. J. Admin. 4-201 (2002). 
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Defendant Lucero should not be allowed to undermine the criminal justice system 
through this manipulation. 
The record makes Defendant Lucero's manipulation clear. Defendant Lucero 
was sentenced on June 4, 2002.77 His right to appeal to District Court expired thirty 
days later, on July 4, 2002.78 However, on July 3, 2002, one day before the July 4 
expiration, the Murray Justice Court docket shows that he filed a Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief Or, In The Alternative, Motion To Correct Illegally Imposed 
Sentence.79 Unhappy with his incarceration, but conceding guilt, he chose to forego a 
trial de novo, where his guilt or innocence would have been revisited. Instead, he 
wanted to exploit post-conviction review which requires for this type of claim-the 
denial of his right to counsel-a fact-specific review of the record. Such a review is 
very difficult in a justice court because justice courts are only required to keep 
minimal documentation and have no verbatim recording of their proceedings.80 In 
fact, Defendant Lucero argues that without a verbatim recording of his guilty plea 
hearing, there is no "record" at all to refute his claim.81 By choosing the post-
conviction procedure for review, instead of trial de novo appeal, he has shifted 
77Fact^[23. 
78
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-120(1) (2002). 
79
 Fact 126. 
80
 Utah R. J. Admin. 9-301 (2002) and UTAH CODE ANN. §78-5-101 (2002). 
81
 Appellant's Brief at 22-3. 
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District Court's review from the substance of his guilt or innocence, to the limited 
record of justice court. By this manipulation, he seeks to avoid the incarceration 
portion of his sentence, asking that it be vacated.82 
There exists an exception, not applicable here, that allows review of claimed 
error without appeal where unusual circumstances exist that "show that there was an 
obvious injustice or substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right."83 To 
fit this exception, Defendant Lucero would have to invite this Court to adopt the 
narrow view that as a matter of law, a guilty plea in a justice court is a substantial and 
prejudicial denial of a defendant's constitutional rights. That view should be 
rejected. To determine whether unusual circumstances exists, the Court should look 
at the impact of the alleged rights violation on the outcome of the proceeding. The 
question is whether Defendant Lucero would have pleaded guilty even in the absence 
of the violation. Lucero has not alleged that his sentencing was outside the statutory 
minimums or sentencing guidelines for a DUI. In the evidentiary hearing, Defendant 
Lucero's Counsel stated that, on the contrary, 
"We believe the plea was appropriately taken, the conviction should 
stand. I think that the other terms of sentence-of sentence we've not 
challenged in terms of the fine or the probation terms that were also 
imposed by Judge Ferrero on Mr. Lucero, believe that those terms 
would remain. Our issue is just that the jail be vacated and I do think 
82
 Appellant's Brief at 49. 
83
 Carter v. Galetka. 2001 UT 96, %, 44 P.3d 626, 630 (internal citation 
omitted). 
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that the case law that we brought this under, most particularly Shelton, 
does declare that would be the proper remedy."84 
Defendant Lucero has not shown and cannot show any obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right because he has stated, even 
with the assistance of counsel, he does not want to withdraw his guilty plea.85 The 
result cannot be considered unjust or prejudicial if Defendant Lucero chooses the 
same result now, while he is represented, as that which he obtained pro se. 
In a similar case, a defendant brought a habeas corpus proceeding in District 
Court to prevent the Salt Lake City Justice Court, also a court not of record, from 
revoking his probation for drunk driving, arguing that he was denied assistance of 
counsel. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the defendant had a remedy of appealing 
his judgment and sentence to the District Court.86 The Webster Court stated: "When 
he failed to do so, [the judgment and sentence] should be considered to be at rest and 
not subject to what would be in effect a belated appeal by the use of habeas corpus 
proceedings."87 According to Webster, "[t]he rule which we recognize is that the writ 
may be used in certain exigent circumstances, including where the court was without 
jurisdiction, or there has been such unfairness or failure to accord due process of law 
84R. 116:36-7. 
85
 R. 116: 25, 36, Appellant's Brief at 43. 
86
 Webster v. Jones. 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978Y 
87Id.at530. 
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that it would be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction/'88 In this 
case, there was nothing that occurred that was unfair to Defendant Lucero, much less 
unconscionable. 
If Defendant Lucero is allowed to maintain his guilty plea yet have a portion 
of his sentence vacated by this Court without first proceeding to District Court, he 
and other defendants would be able to circumvent an appeal to District Court, and 
have this Court vacate jail sentences because there was no "on the record colloquy." 
This result essentially makes it impossible for justice courts to function. This Court 
should not allow this result. 
The question of jurisdiction to entertain Defendant Lucero's post-conviction 
petition was not raised in District Court but is being raised first, here. "Ordinarily 
appellate courts will not review unassigned errors. However, in a case where the 
jurisdiction of a lower court is involved, the matter may be reviewed without its being 
< 
assigned as error."89 "[S]ubject matter is an issue that can and should be addressed 
sua sponte when jurisdiction is questionable."90 
88
 Id. (emphasis added.) 
89
 Combs v. Turner, 483 P.2d 437. 440 (Utah 1971). 
90
 Peterson v. Bd of Pardons. 907 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1995) (citations , 
omitted). 
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B. This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction of This Appeal Because Defendant 
Lucero Has Not Shown Cause Why He Failed to Take a Direct Appeal. 
Nowhere in his collateral attack does Defendant Lucero explain why he failed 
to take a direct appeal from the Murray Justice Court. "Under both federal and state 
laws, a petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding must show cause for a procedural 
default and the resulting prejudice he suffered."91 According to this Court ".. .case 
law holds that to successfully attack a guilty plea collaterally, a petitioner must 
demonstrate an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right in the reception of the plea and must show cause why he or she 
took no direct appeal."92 
Both Wells and Summers, involved the denial of motions to withdraw guilty 
pleas. Appeals were not taken from the denial of the motions, and habeas petitions 
were later filed. The material difference between Wells and Summers is that the 
Summers defendant explained why he did not appeal whereas the Wells defendant 
did not. The petition in Wells was, therefore, not heard. Here, as in Wells, 
Defendant Lucero gave no explanation why he failed to take a direct appeal. Like 
Wells, appellate review of the dismissal of Defendant Lucero's habeas petition after 
an evidentiary hearing is precluded. 
91
 Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987). 
92
 Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 34 (Utah App Ct 1988) citing Wells v. Shulsen. 
747 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS COURT TAKES JURISDICTION, THERE IS A 
REASONABLE BASIS, CONSIDERING THE RECORD AS A 
WHOLE, TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
THAT DEFENDANT LUCERO KNOWINGLY AND 
INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
A. The District Court Properly Considered the Entire Record of the Case to 
Determine if Defendant Lucero Knowingly and Intelligently Waived His 
Right to Counsel. 
There, is no dispute that Defendant Lucero was entitled to an attorney. He, 
however, waived that right. "The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees a defendant's right to representation through his or her criminal trial."93 
The recent United States Supreme Court case of Alabama v. Shelton extended this 
right to any defendant who receives a suspended or probated sentence.94 
In reviewing Defendant Lucero's Petition, the District Court properly 
considered all available evidence in the record as a whole. Defendant Lucero argues 
that since "[t]here is no transcript from the Murray Justice Court from which to 
conclude that the justice court conducted a constitutionally adequate colloquy with 
Defendant Lucero or otherwise met the requirements for a constitutionally adequate 
waiver..." his sentence should be vacated.95 He contends that in reviewing a claim 
93
 Utah v. Petty. 2001 UT App 396,<[5, 38 P.3d 998, 1000. 
94
 Alabama v. Shelton. 535 U.S. 654, 674, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 1776 (2002). 
95
 Appellant's Brief at 22 and 49. 
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of error from the Murray Justice Court, the District Court can only consider what a 
defendant said or was told at the taking of the guilty plea, and not any information, 
irrespective of its relevance, contained elsewhere in the record.96 But even in Boykin 
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) where the United States Supreme Court established 
the requirement of an affirmative showing of a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea 
"on the record," the Court there did not declare that "the record" is limited to the 
record of the exchange between judge and the accused at the time in which the guilty 
plea is entered.97 
Under the Utah Constitution and state statutory law, justice courts are not 
courts of record.98 Because the Murray Justice Court is a court not of record, it would 
96
 Appellant's Brief at 22-23. 
97
 Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 f 1969V 
98UTAH CODE ANN. §78-5-101 (2002) and UTAH CONST, art. 8, § 1. 
Although not of record, Justice Courts are required by state law to follow certain 
procedures and keep certain records during arraignment and convictions where the 
conviction may be used to enhance a later penalty. Utah R. J. Admin.9-301 (2002). 
The procedure required is to 
(A) Advise the defendant, orally and in writing of the defendant's 
rights, the elements of the charged offense, the penalties for the charge 
offense, and the enhancement penalty which may be imposed in the 
event the defendant is convicted of the same offense in the future; and 
(B) Require the defendant to sign a statement acknowledging that the 
defendant understands his rights and that he knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily waives those rights. Id. 
Additionally, UTAH CODE ANN. §78-5-121 itemizes what must be included in 
the docket of the court, and a rights waiver is not included within that listing. 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be impossible to show that the defendant understood the proceedings if the only part 
of the record that could be considered is the colloquy between the judge and the 
defendant. To require a justice court to memorialize the defendant's understanding of 
the elements covered in the colloquy would require the justice court to become a court 
of record. Justice courts, however, need to be courts not of record. Former Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Michael Zimmerman stated: 
"[T]he solution, however is not to turn justice courts into courts of 
record.. . . "[T]o try to turn justice courts into courts of record is 
absurd." This solution was attempted two decades ago with the 
experimentation of circuit courts, and the attempt was eventually 
abandoned due to ineffectiveness. Furthermore, such a solution would { 
undermine the fact that the lack of record in justice courts, which 
ensures low cost and informality, is one of the justice courts' greatest 
qualities. " " 
In waiver of right to counsel cases, when no recording of the colloquy 
discussing the waiver of counsel between defendant and judge is available, courts will, 
in extraordinary circumstances, review the record as a whole to determine whether the { 
waiver was valid. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "[i]n the absence of such a 
colloquy, this court will look at the record and make a de novo determination 
i 
regarding the validity of the defendant's waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, 
the existence of which we will address on a case-by-case basis."100 Further, "[e]ven 
99
 Benjamin W. Bates, Exploring Justice Courts in Utah and Three Problems 
Inherent in the Justice Court System. 2001 Utah Law Rev. 731. 758-59 (2001\ 
• i 
100
 State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 911. 918 (Utah 1998). 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
absent such a colloquy, however, this Court will look at any evidence in the record 
which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se.m And 
finally, in a recent case where a defendant wanted to collaterally attack a guilty plea 
given in Springville Justice Court, this Court recognized that although the plea was 
entered in a court not of record, the defendant "could have produced testimony from 
those who were present at the taking of his plea, the court's docket sheet, or other 
affirmative evidence."102 
In dismissing the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, the District Court 
properly considered the evidence beyond the colloquy, including the proffer of counsel 
as to Murray Justice Court Judge's practice, the affidavit of the Murray Justice Court 
clerks as to courtroom custom, the Murray Justice Court docket, the Judge Michael 
Hutchings video Defendant Lucero viewed regarding his rights, and execution of the 
Rights Waiver.103 In addition, he received testimony from Defendant Lucero.104 The 
District Court specifically noted that "it doesn't appear that there were any objections 
to the proffer, it doesn't appear that there were any objections to the affidavit, it 
doesn't appear there was any objections to the docket, it does not appear there was any 
objections to the tape, it does not appear that there was any objections to 
101
 State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). 
102
 State v. Gutierrez. 2003 UT App 95, ^ [12, 68 P.2d 1038, 1038. 
103
 R. 116:43. 
104
 R. 116:20-25. 
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. . . the driving under the influence rights waiver.. .".105 Defendant Lucero now 
argues that the evidence he had no objection to during the hearing should be excluded 
from consideration in determining whether there was a valid waiver.106 Under 
decisions by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, the District Court properly 
considered all relevant evidence in the record as a whole. 
B. There is Reasonable Basis to Support the Decision That Defendant Lucero 
Understood His Right to Counsel and Waived It. 
In reviewing the District Court's decision to deny the Petition for Extraordinary 
Post-Conviction Relief, this Court determines whether there was a reasonable basis to 
support the decision.107 In doing so, this Court reviews the record in the light most 
favorable to the District Court's findings and conclusion.108 The District Court's 
findings of facts will only be disturbed if they are clearly erroneous.109 
The District Court's findings of fact were as follows: (a) Defendant Lucero 
appeared pro se throughout the proceedings at Murray City Justice Court; (b) the case 
was continued twice at Defendant Lucero's request in order for him to retain an 
attorney; (c) Defendant Lucero was not new to the justice system; (d) Defendant 
105R. 116:43. 
106
 See Appellant's Brief at 24. 
107
 Matthews v. Galetka. 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
108Id. 
109Id. 
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Lucero viewed a video explaining his constitutional rights, including his right to 
counsel; (e) the practice of the Murray Justice Court Judge is to explain the right to 
counsel prior to accepting a plea; and Defendant Lucero read and signed a Rights 
Waiver specifically advising him of his right to counsel and the maximum penalties 
(including jail time) for the offense he had been charged.110 
Other evidence favorable to the District Court's findings show that Defendant 
Lucero was advised of his rights and penalties at the arraignment and again at the 
bench trial.111 During the evidentiary hearing, Defendant Lucero testified that when 
he told Murray Justice Court Judge that he could not afford a lawyer, the Murray 
Justice Court Judge questioned him about how much money he made, and told 
Defendant Lucero that he could not have an attorney because he made too much 
money.112 Defendant Lucero indicated that he understood that if he qualified for an 
appointed attorney, one would be appointed.113 The Murray Justice Court docket 
shows that over ten months passed from the time of the violation to the date when 
110
 R. 116:100. 
111
 Appellant's Brief at 30-33. 
112
 R. 116:22. 
113
 Fact 111. 
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Defendant Lucero claimed his indigency.114 It was within this time frame that 
Defendant Lucero made both requests for continuances.115 
An explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding 
that a defendant waives the right to counsel. A court may infer a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of counsel from the defendant's failure to retain counsel. In U.S. v. 
Weninger, the Tenth Circuit stated that defendant's "stubborn refusal" to hire counsel, 
despite his ability to hire counsel and despite warnings from the judge as a knowing 
and intelligent waiver must be accepted.116 In this case, like in Weninger, Defendant 
Lucero's conduct shows he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel 
and that he wanted to proceed pro se. Defendant Lucero knew at the arraignment on 
June 14, 2001 that he had the right to counsel and that counsel would be appointed for 
him if he could not afford counsel.117 He refused to hire counsel. In a telephone call 
on April 24, 2002, Defendant Lucero advises the Murray Justice Court he will forego 
114
 R. 21 and 28. 
115
 Fact 112-14. 
116
 U.S. v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir.), cert denied 449 U.S. 1012 
(1980). 
117
 Fact \A and 11. 
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trial acknowledging that he will proceed pro se.m And finally, he signed the Rights 
Waiver which included the right to counsel admonishment.119 
Defendant Lucero contends further, that without a record to show the specific 
warning of the "dangers and disadvantages" of self-representation, a valid waiver 
cannot be shown.120 Although this Court recommends an express warning to the 
potential pro se defendant against self-representation, this court also held "that a 
recommendation by the court against self-representation is not necessary for a 
defendant to intelligently waive the right to counsel."121 
Other state's courts have found that because the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation are much greater at trial than when a defendant pleads guilty, the 
admonishment requirement against self-representation is not triggered when a 
defendant pleads guilty. The Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that "[s]ince the 
dangers and disadvantages to a defendant without counsel are substantially greater at 
trial than at a misdemeanor plea proceeding, we cannot accept the notion that a 
defendant must not be allowed to plead guilty until after the court has discoursed at 
118Fact^[15. 
119
 Fact <[16. 
120
 Appellant's Brief at 33. 
121
 State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 785 (Utah Ct. App 1996). 
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length and in detail as to why it might be better for him to retain counsel and not plead 
guilty."122 
Finally, at the evidentiary hearing, the District Court Judge queried Defendant 
Lucero as to the relief he sought. Defendant Lucero, through his legal counsel, stated 
that 
"we're not asking that Mr. Lucero's plea or conviction be upset We 
believe that those . . . are proper and valid."123 
If the Defendant Lucero does not challenge his guilty plea or conviction, there is no 
need for this Court to review whether Defendant Lucero knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel prior to and at the time he entered his plea of guilty . Even 
though he knows the available penalties and has the assistance of legal counsel, he still 
does not want to "upset" his guilty plea or conviction.124 It is, therefore, difficult to 
understand why Defendant Lucero would devote much of his argument as to whether 
he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel prior to and at the time he 
entered his plea of guilty. Further, it is incongruous for Defendant Lucero to argue 
that he has no constitutional challenges to his plea of guilty or conviction and yet ask 
122
 People v. Schneider. 429 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Ct. App. Mich. 1988). See 
also, Hatten v. State. 71 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. Crim. App 2002) after remand 89 S.W.3d 
160 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002), and Redington v. State. 678 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1997). 
123Fact^[30. 
124Id. 
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this Court to vacate a suspended jail sentence because he did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his right to counsel. 
The above findings of facts, and marshaled evidence in the record as a whole, 
including Defendant Lucero's testimony, supports a reasonable basis for the District 
Court's findings and conclusion that Defendant Lucero knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Murray Justice Court respectfully requests that this 
Court find that it does not have jurisdiction of this case. If this Court determines that 
it has jurisdiction of this case, the Murray Justice Court respectfully requests that the 
Court uphold the decision of the District Court in dismissing the Petition by Defendant 
Lucero for Extraordinary and Post-Conviction Relief. 
Respectfully submitted this /1 day of August, 2003. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Murray Justice Court 
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i 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
i 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article VIII, Section 1. [Judicial powers -- Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of 
general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as the 
Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and such 
other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not of record shall 
also be established by statute. 
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Utah Code -- Title 78 -- Chapter 05 -- Justice Courts 
78-5-101. Creation of justice court--Not of record. 
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, there is created a court not of record 
known as the justice court. The judges of this court are justice court judges. 
78-5-120. Appeals from justice court -- Trial or hearing de novo in district court. 
(1) In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court only 
if the defendant files a notice of appeal within 30 days of: 
(a) sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a plea of guilty in the justice court 
resulting in a finding or verdict of guilt; 
78-5-120. Appeals from justice court - Trial or hearing de novo in district court. 
7) The decision of the district court is final and may not be appealed unless the district 
court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. 
Post-conviction Remedies Act 
Utah Code — Title 78 -- Chapter 35a -- Post-conviction Remedies Act 
78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies. 
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges 
a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal 
remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). Procedural 
provisions for filing and commencement of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 65B, Extraordinary relief, 
(a) Availability of remedy. 
Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a person may petition 
the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) 
(involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the 
wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the 
wrongful use of judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by 
the Board of Pardons and Parole). There shall be no special form of writ. Except for 
instances governed by Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings 
on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide 
special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed 
by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. 
Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall govern all petitions 
claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court 
may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement. 
The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the court in 
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the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in which 
the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. 
The petition shall contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the 
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place where the person 
is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by the 
petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in the 
prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available 
to the petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition 
a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated 
the legality of the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. 
The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the 
petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which 
shall be filed with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. 
On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint 
has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim 
in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an 
order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the 
reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of 
law. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall 
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. 
If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the 
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i 
clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon 
the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the 
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within 
which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also 
issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the 
legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the 
respondent has restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the 
person so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the identity of 
the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or authority for the transfer. 
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon the 
petition based upon a dispositive motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. 
If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed from the court's 
jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing order 
can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the 
respondent before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination 
of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the 
custody of such other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. 
If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other than the 
respondent has custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and 
any other process issued by the court may be served on the person having custody in 
the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been named as respondent in 
the action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. 
If anyone having custody of the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the 
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hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's 
jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff 
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to 
law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. 
In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a 
summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other 
person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall 
state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent 
to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right 
to be present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The 
hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in 
the order or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the 
proceeding to the respondent. 
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. 
The attorney general may, and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition 
the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph. Any person who is 
not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or 
threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may 
petition the court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an 
office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition 
under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a 
person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the 
name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with 
sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for costs and damages that may be recovered 
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against the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on 
appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. 
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps, intrudes into, or 
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or 
an office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a 
public officer does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) 
where persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally 
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah 
relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or (E) where any 
corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. 
On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties 
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party 
to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in 
accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by board 
of pardons and parole. 
(1) Who may petition. 
A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in 
this paragraph may petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. 
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, 
or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) 
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where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the 
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; 
or (D) where the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to 
perform an act required by constitutional or statutory law. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. 
On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties 
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party 
to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, 
administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to 
deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also 
grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. 
Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not 
extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its 
authority. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief. 
(a) Scope. 
This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and venue. 
The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district 
court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition 
should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue 
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on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a 
change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the petition. 
The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of 
the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction 
or sentence may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. 
The petition shall state: 
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the 
dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's 
case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's 
claim to relief; 
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation 
of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the 
appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the appeal; 
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those 
proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior proceeding; 
and. 
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the 
reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be 
addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition. 
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(d) Attachments to the petition. 
If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition: 
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations; 
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the 
direct appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other 
civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and. 
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of authorities. 
The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the 
petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which 
shall be filed with the petition. 
(f) Assignment. 
On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge 
who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not 
available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course. 
(g) (1) Summary dismissal of claims. -
The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any 
claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition 
appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the 
claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous 
on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim 
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shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need 
not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained 
in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or. 
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the 
filing of the petition. 
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or 
failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the 
petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one additional 20 
day period to amend for good cause shown. 
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction 
petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of petitions. 
If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should 
not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that 
are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and 
memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony 
conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney 
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted 
the petitioner. 
(i) Answer or other response. 
Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service 
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of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as 
the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions 
of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other 
response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time 
allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further 
pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
(j) Hearings. 
After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or 
otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but 
the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of 
the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may: 
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and. 
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be 
presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. 
The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not 
represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of 
telephone or video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at 
hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the 
petitioner is confined. 
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(1) Discovery; records. 
Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a 
party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is 
necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to be admissible at an 
evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to 
obtain any relevant transcript or court records. 
(m) Orders; stay. 
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a 
sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the stay 
period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the 
respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no 
action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, 
the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the 
petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the 
trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, 
custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. 
The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any 
party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the 
costs to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the 
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petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and 
sections 21-7-3 through 21-7-4.7 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial 
court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. 
Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the 
statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
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